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— PRELIMINARY: COMMENTS WELCOME —
Abstract
There are many examples of markets involving two groups of participants who need
to interact via intermediaries. Moreover, these intermediaries usually have to compete
for business from both groups. Examples include academic publishing (where journals
facilitate the interaction between authors and readers), advertising in media markets
(where newspapers or TV channels enable adverts from producers to reach consumers),
payment systems (where credit cards can be a convenient method of transaction be-
tween consumers and retailers), and telecommunications networks (where networks are
used to provide links between callers and those who receive calls). The paper surveys
recent theoretical work on these two-sided markets. The main questions are (i) what
determines which side of the market is subsidized (if either) in order to attract the
other side, and (ii) is the resulting outcome socially e¢cient?
¤Paper presented at the ESEM meeting in Venice, August 2002. I am very grateful to Xavier Vives for
acting as my discussant and for making several useful comments. I am also grateful to Simon Anderson,
Ted Bergstrom, Steve Coate, Volker Nocke, Martin Peitz, Hyun Shin, Daniel Spulber, Jean Tirole, Myrna
Wooders and Julian Wright for discussion and information.
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1 Examples of Two-Sided Markets
There are several examples of markets or institutions involving two groups of participants,
say group 1 and group 2, who interact via intermediaries. Surplus is created—or destroyed
in the case of negative externalities—when 1 and 2 interact, but this interaction must be
mediated in some way. In most interesting cases, “two-sided” network e¤ects are present,
and the surplus enjoyed by group 1 depends on the number of group 2 participants with
the same intermediary. Consider the following list of examples.
Example 1 (CONFERENCES) Surplus is usually created when speakers address an audi-
ence at a conference. Normally both sides enjoy a direct bene…t from the interaction: the
audience learns what the speakers have to say, while the speakers enjoy disseminating their
work and being the focus of attention. Typically, conferences compete for speakers and audi-
ences. A common way to organize the interaction is for the audience to pay to attend and for
the speakers to be paid. Is there a good explanation for this feature? (Note that conferences
in which most of the audience also present a paper, and where most of the speakers also
listen, do not …t the theme of this paper well since there are not then two distinct groups that
need to be attracted, but only the single group of ‘participants’.) Institutions such as music
(or other arts) festivals would also …t into this framework.
Example 2 (ACADEMIC JOURNALS) Very similar is the market for academic publishing.
Journals compete both for authors and for readers. In the economics …eld, a common (but not
universal) way to organize the interaction is for readers to pay and for (successful) authors
to publish for free. But in other scienti…c disciplines, it is commonplace for (successful)
authors to pay a substantial per-page charge for publication.
Example 3 (UNIVERSITY TEACHING) Staying with the academic theme, universities
have to compete for both students and for professors. As with the previous examples, quality
as much as quantity is perhaps the relevant dimension here: students care about the “quality”
of professors and professors care about the “quality” of their students. (A separate issue is
the fact that professors also care about the quality of their fellow professors.) If a university
is successful in attracting top students, it may have to o¤er a lower salary to a professor of
given quality than otherwise. It is sometimes suggested, for example, that PhD programs at
business schools often run at a loss, and this is acceptable as it gives a more “academic ”
atmosphere to the institution. All three of these academic examples share the feature that
intermediaries might not be maximizing pro…ts.
Example 4 (SOFTWARE) Software such as “Acrobat” is used for writers disseminate con-
tent and for readers to be able to read the content. It is feasible to sell di¤erent software to
these two groups. Writers are more likely to buy the “writing” software if there are many
people with access to the “reading” software, and readers are more likely to invest in the read-
ing software if they expect to receive many documents in the relevant format. A common
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charging arrangement is for “readers” to receive their software for free and for “writers” to
pay a fee for their software.
Example 5 (CONTENT IN MEDIA MARKETS) People are more likely to buy a news-
paper or watch a TV channel, the greater variety of content it contains. In the newspaper
context, this content would be “columnists” and the like. In the TV case, it might be “TV
personalities”. Most usually, columnists are contracted on an exclusive basis to the newspa-
per. Clearly, the more such content the paper attracts, the easier it will be able to attract
readers. Also, it is plausible that columnists will, in addition to their salary, get bene…t from
communicating their opinions to a wide readership.
Example 6 (ADVERTISING IN MEDIA MARKETS) Advertisers/retailers wish to gain
access to potential consumers to tempt them to buy products. Often advertising is ‘bundled’
with other services, such as newspapers, magazines, radio or TV, who act as intermediaries
between advertisers and consumers. Revenues from advertising are often used to subsidise
the media product for readers/viewers. (Historically, for the case of broadcasting, technology
meant that viewers/listeners could not pay directly for the service, and so broadcasters without
public funding more-or-less had to …nd funding from advertisers. But this is less true now for
television.) In some special cases, viewers/readers might not bene…t directly from advertising,
or might actually dislike intrusive advertising. But, for instance in the case of informative
advertising, viewers/readers might well bene…t from the presence of advertising, as is the
case in the next example.
Example 7 (YELLOW PAGES) A form of mediated advertising that is not bundled with
other services are ‘yellow pages’ directories and similar products. Typically, consumers re-
ceive one or more directories for free, while advertisers pay to be included in the book. In the
case of competition between directories, if there are costs involved in consulting more than
one directory, consumers are perhaps more likely to use the directory with more adverts,
while an advertiser will be prepared to pay more to be included in a directory with a wider
readership. On the other hand, keeping readership …xed, an advertiser might prefer to be in
a directory with fewer other adverts. This might be for two reasons: (i) its own advert might
become “lost” among the others, or (ii) a reader might see an advert for a competing product
and call that number instead.
Example 8 (SHOPPING MALLS) Continuing with the theme of matching consumers to
retailers, another example of this is the shopping mall. Often, there are several malls in the
relevant area which therefore compete for consumers and/or retailers. Typically, retailers
pay rent to malls while consumers have free entry (and might also have additional features,
such as free convenient parking, o¤ered to attract them). Typically, consumers care about the
number and quality of retailers when they decide which mall to visit, and obviously retailers
care about the number consumers coming through the mall. Like the previous yellow pages
example, business stealing e¤ects might mean that, all else equal, a retailer might prefer to
be in a mall with fewer other (competing) shops.
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Example 9 (PAYMENT SYSTEMS) Still continuing with the theme of facilitating interac-
tions between consumers and retailers, consider the various methods of paying for products,
including cash and various kinds of ‘card’ payment. Both consumers and retailers may de-
rive direct bene…ts (in terms of convenience or security) from using one method over another.
(This is the relevant surplus created from the interaction, not the surplus created by the con-
sumer buying the product itself, which will, in many cases, occur regardless of the chosen
payment method.) To the extent that a consumer only chooses a limited number of payment
instruments, he/she will have regard for the number of retailers who choose to accept a given
payment method. Similarly, if there are set-up costs in being able to accept a given payment
method, a retailer will have regard for the number of consumers who use that method. A
common contractual arrangement is for consumers to be able to use a payment card with
little or no charge, and for retailers to be asked to cover the costs of the transaction.
Example 10 (TELECOMMUNICATIONS WITH CALL EXTERNALITIES) Both callers
and recipients of calls typically derive some bene…t from telephone calls, which are mediated
by a telecommunications network. (The recipient’s bene…t is termed the “call externality”.)
There is often vigorous competition between networks for subscribers. Most subscribers both
make and receive calls, and so it is less clear that there are ‘two sides’ in this market.
However, if one thinks of “subscription to a network” as one side and “number of calls
made to a network” as the other side, then this industry …ts into this framework. The more
calls a network receives (for instance, because it sets a low charge for delivering calls), the
more attractive the network is for subscribers; and naturally, the more subscribers a network
has, the more calls it will receive. An ine¢cient pattern of pricing can sometimes be seen,
with networks exploiting their monopoly position over delivering calls to their subscribers
and using the proceeds to subsidize connections to the network (perhaps in the form of ‘free
mobile handsets’).
Example 11 (FISCAL COMPETITION) Governments are interested in attracting mobile
factors of production (manufacturing plant, football teams, skilled labour) with tax incentives.
(Factors are mobile to some extent, and so governments must compete for such factors.) To
the extent that factors are complementary in a production process, governments are keen
to attract ‘both sides’ of the production process simultaneously. Di¤erent factors may have
di¤erent levels of mobility, however, and this will a¤ect the equilibrium tax incidence.
Example 12 (UNREGULATED BANKING) Banks act as intermediaries between savers
and borrowers. Without e¤ective banking regulation, bank failure is a possibility, and so
potential savers will be interested in how secure their funds would be, and hence how well
the bank is doing on the lending side of the market. As such, this …ts into the topic of
this paper. However, e¤ective deposit regulation will largely eliminate this risk, and the
consequent externality that otherwise exists between the two sides of the market.
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Example 13 (MATCHMAKING SERVICES) Similar features are present in the match-
making markets, such as those for dating services. Each side of the market cares positively
about the number of people on the other side (and perhaps they care negatively about the
number of people on their own side). It is sometimes the case that one side of the market is
subsidized, and used to ‘attract’ the other side from whom surplus can then be extracted.
Example 14 (SMOKERS AND NON-SMOKERS) In a restaurant or aircraft, non-smokers
(and even smokers) typically care about the number of people smoking in the space. Unlike
many of the previous examples, this is a negative inter-group externality. Another di¤erence
with the previous examples is that the ‘intermediary’ can a¤ect the extent of the externality,
namely, by instituting a non-smoking policy. Such a policy presumably entails a utility loss
for smokers, and in a competitive environment, an intermediary must trade o¤ this disutility
against the extra attraction it now has for the non-smokers. In the case of airlines (outside of
Asia at least), the equilibrium is clearly to have a non-smoking policy, whereas for restaurants
the pattern is more mixed.
This is a highly selective list. It ignores many software applications that exhibit the same
features, for instance.1 And of course there are very many examples of ‘two-sided’ markets
with competing intermediaries, and which are more ‘ordinary’ than the examples above. For
instance, a ‘…rm’ needs to compete for labour (and other factors of production) at the same
time as it competes for consumers of its output. However, such examples are di¤erent in
that participants on one side of the interaction do not really care how well the intermediary
does on the other side, but only about the terms on which they deal with the intermediary.
In sum, in these more prosaic examples, there are no inter-group network externalities at
work.2
In addition, there are many examples of important inter-group externalities which are
not mediated at all. Obvious examples come from economic geography, where one group is
more likely to locate in an area where another, complementary group has located (and vice
versa). This paper does not discuss this well-understood phenomenon further.3
This paper is largely about the case of competitive intermediation. Thus, to a greater
or lesser extent, any pro…ts made on one side of the market by an intermediary are used to
attract participants on the other side. Perhaps the main questions are (i) what determines
1See Rochet and Tirole (2001) for several examples of two-sided competition in the software and internet
industries.
2This discussion assumes that the intermediary is the price setter for the two groups. However, if wages,
say, are determined by a bargaining process of some kind (perhaps as in the model of Stole and Zwiebel
(1996))), then workers could care about how well the …rm does in the …nal product market since that a¤ects
the surplus over which it bargains.
3A recent paper that examines this kind of issue is Ellison and Fudenberg (2002). This paper investigates
competing (standard) auction markets and, in particular, whether two auction markets can co-exist even if
there is no intrinsic product di¤erentiation between them.
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which side of the market is subsidized (if either) and (ii) when is the resulting allocation
socially e¢cient?
In broad terms, there are two features that determine the answer to these questions. First,
does one side of the market bene…t more from the interaction than the other? (If group A
gains little from interacting with group B, then it is plausible that the former group will need
an extra incentive to participate.) Second, are there reasons why one or both sides of the
market will use only a single intermediary? (Rochet and Tirole (2001) use the term “single-
homing” for this phenomenon.) If so, then competition can be expected to be particularly
intense on that side. For instance, if people tend to read just a single newspaper, perhaps
because of time constraints, then the newspaper has a monopoly position over delivering
adverts to their readers and can therefore extract rents from advertisers. These rents are
then used to attract readers. By contrast, if people read several newspapers then a given
paper has a monopoly in providing access only to its exclusive readers, which could be a
small group.
2 The Literature
Monopoly Intermediation: Most of the work on payment systems has been on the monopoly
case—see Baxter (1983) for a pioneering contribution, followed more recently by (among
others) Rochet and Tirole (2002), Schmalensee (2002) and Wright (2001). See also Baye and
Morgan (200) and Baye and Morgan (2001) for an analysis of monopoly intermediation on
the internet.
Gehrig (1993) provides an interesting early analysis of this issue. (His paper is mainly
about the case of a monopoly intermediary.) In his model there is a homogeneous product,
and a group of buyers and group of sellers of this product. Buyers di¤er in their reservation
price for a unit of the product, as do sellers. Without intermediation, buyers and sellers must
search for a suitable trading partner, which entails delay and an uncertain eventual price.
Suppose that an intermediary is introduced who can, unlike the other agents, broadcast a
buying and selling price to all agents. Agents can choose whether to go to the intermediary
or to remain in the search market. If the intermediary attracts fewer sellers than buyers,
then buyers must be rationed according to some rule, and similarly if there are more sellers
than buyers. (If an agent is rationed, she will be returned to the search market.) In this
sense there are two-sided network externalities: for a given price, sellers are better o¤ the
more buyers there are at the intermediary (and they are worse o¤ with more other sellers),
since this reduces the chance that they will be rationed. Gehrig shows that one natural
equilibrium involves the intermediary o¤ering a positive bid-ask spread and some agents
(those without strong gains from trade) continuing to use the search market. As one would
expect, the size of the bid-ask spread increases with the frictions in the search market.
Early work on two-sided competition with network e¤ects: Stahl (1988) and Yanelle (1989)
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model …rms as competing (either sequentially or simultaneously) both for inputs and for
outputs. A natural strategy to investigate is for a …rm to try to compete hard for inputs
(by pricing low in that side of the market), in order to disadvantage its rival in the retail
side of the market. When there is a …xed relationship between inputs and outputs (one unit
of input is transformed into one unit of output), rationing plays an important role (as with
Gehrig (1993)). Because of this, there are inter-group externalities present that a¤ect the
competitive outcome. We will discuss a somewhat more tractable model of …rms competing
both for inputs and for outputs (but without a …xed relationship between the two) in section
4.2 below.4
Call termination in telecommunications : Section 3.1 of Armstrong (2002b) and Wright
(2002) propose a model of competition between mobile telecommunications networks. Here,
mobile networks compete to sign up subscribers. They also charge …xed line networks when
they deliver calls to their mobile subscribers. The more they charge for this, the fewer calls
a mobile subscriber will receive. Since subscribers typically like getting calls, a mobile net-
work must trade o¤ which side of the market to make money on. A common practice is for
networks to subsidise their subscribers’ charges (via handset subsidies and the like), and to
extract pro…t from the people who call their subscribers.
Advertising in media markets : Anderson and Coate (2001) present a model where TV chan-
nels compete for viewers (but not using prices), and advertisers wish to gain access to these
viewers.5 Viewers can view adverts as a ‘nuisance’. It is assumed that viewers watch only
a single channel over the relevant time horizon, and so a channel has a monopoly over pro-
viding this access. At a result there is socially too little advertising in equilibrium whenever
the ‘nuisance factor’ of adverts is su¢ciently unimportant. (If viewers greatly dislike adverts
then there will too much advertising.)
Rysman (2002) is, to my knowledge, the only structural empirical investigation into mar-
kets with two-sided network externalities. This paper estimates the importance of network
e¤ects (on both sides of the market) in the market for yellow pages. The theoretical underpin-
nings of his model are discussed further in section 5.4 below. He estimates that externalities
are signi…cant on both sides of the market: users are more likely to use a directory containing
more adverts, while an advertiser will pay more to place an advert in a directory that is used
by more people.
Competing Matchmakers : A class of examples of “competition in two-sided markets” is
that of competing matchmakers, such as dating agencies, real estate agents, and internet
“business-to-business” websites. The focus of these examples is naturally very much on the
4See Gehrig (1996) and Yanelle (1997) for analyses of the banking industry, where the two sides of the
market are “savings” and “loans”, that build on these earlier papers.
5Page 588 of Armstrong and Vickers (2001) has a short discussion of advertising in media markets, which
involves this same kind of model. See also Gabszewicz, Lauussel, and Sonnac (2001) for an analysis of the
e¤ect of advertising revenue on the political stance taken by newspapers.
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quality of a given match, and heterogeneity of agents plays a crucial role. As a result, there is
a rich set of contracting possibilities in these examples: for instance, one might have ‘joining
fee’ in combination with a fee in the event of ‘successful match’. For instance, a new entrant
might …nd it useful to charge its clients only in the event of a successful match, since such a
strategy means that potential customers are not deterred from joining the new …rm by the
possibility that they will pay an up-front fee and yet too few other people have joined. These
issues are largely ignored in the following analysis. Relevant work in this area is van Raalte
and Webers (1998), Caillaud and Jullien (2001) and Caillaud and Jullien (2002). A focus of
this work is the possibility of asymmetric outcomes, including those where one intermediary
corners the market. Again, I do not investigate this important issue in this paper.
To explore one paper in more detail, consider Caillaud and Jullien (2002). This paper
examines a model in which each buyer generates positive surplus with exactly one of the
sellers.6 (Given that there is a continuum of buyers and sellers, there is therefore no scope
for ‘bypassing’ the intermediaries by independent search, as in Gehrig (1993), since the
chance of meeting your unique match is zero.) If intermediary i has a fraction nil of the type
l agents (where l indexes ‘buyers’ and ‘sellers’, say) then if an agent of the other type joins
that intermediary, the chance of that intermediary having your match is nil and the chance of
that intermediary discovering this good match is then ¸nil . Thus, ¸ < 1 represents the degree
of precision of the intermediary’s matching technology. Therefore, an agent’s bene…t from
joining a given intermediary is proportional to the fraction of the other type of agent who
have also joined the intermediary. Finally, intermediaries are assumed not to be intrinsically
di¤erentiated.
Caillaud and Jullien discuss two scenarios. First is the case where, for exogenous reasons,
each agent can only use the services of a single intermediary. In this case, since there is no
product di¤erentiation, it is socially optimal for there to be a single intermediary. The paper
shows that this is also the only equilibrium outcome, and that the ‘successful’ …rmmakes zero
pro…ts. The equilibrium price structure in this case involves charging for successful matches
at the maximum possible rate and subsidizing participation. (As mentioned above, a good
tactic for an entrant is to generate revenue from transactions fees rather than registration
fees. However, if the incumbent does the same then there is no scope for entry.) Second is
the case where agents can register with both intermediaries. This might be socially desirable,
since there is a better chance of making a match with two intermediaries. (If the parameter
¸ is less than 1, there is a chance that a single intermediary will fail to make the match, and
this change is reduced with two intermediaries.) Since an intermediary performs a useful
function for agents, even if agents also use the rival intermediary, equilibrium will generally
involve positive pro…ts. The authors show that the resulting equilibrium is asymmetric: one
…rm o¤ers a low transactions charge and so “gets the business” whenever that intermediary
makes the match, while the other …rm only gets the business when it alone has made the
6This feature implies that there are no same-side “congestion” externalities as there are in, say Gehrig
(1993), since sellers do not compete against each other for buyers.
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match.
Competing Marketplaces: Gehrig (1998) presents a model with two marketplaces, in each of
which there are located a variety of di¤erentiated …rms. Consumers live on a line between
these two markets and decide which market to visit on the basis of a comparison of the
prices and varieties o¤ered at the two ends. There is a separate tax authority for each
market which aims to maximize revenue, which it generates from taxing the transactions
within the market. The model assumes is that the …scal authorities make their choices after
…rms have made their location decisions, and so there is no scope for using …scal policy to
attract …rms to a market. Gehrig investigates competition within a market. In section 5.5 I
examine a related model of competing “shopping malls”, where the simplifying assumption
is made that there is no intra-market competition.
Pricing complementary software products: Parker and Van Alstyne (2000) present an analysis
of two-sided competition in software markets such as acrobat, and the analysis is done
both for monopoly and for competition. They show how a monopolist might well want to
distribute a complementary piece of software for free in order to stimulate demand for the
fully functioning version. They then use this analysis to suggest why a monopolist in one
segment (say, operating systems) might wish to enter a complementary market (say, web
browsers) even if it ends up making no money in the competitive market.
A closely related paper, which, like this paper, does not focus on any single industry,
is Rochet and Tirole (2001). To be concrete, consider the credit card industry, although
their paper discusses many other applications as well. Therefore, one side of the market is
the retailers and the other side is the consumers. Retailers are all monopolies, and there
is no competition between retailers. Much of their analysis involves a model where each
agent obtains a payo¤ per transaction with the other side of the market, and there are no
…xed charges or costs. (This assumption implies the simplifying feature that an agent’s
choice of card does not depend on the number of agents on the other side who use the
same card.) The two credit card companies o¤er charges for using their payment system: a
per-transaction charge to consumers and a per-transaction charge to retailers. Essentially,
given these charges, retailers …rst decide which cards to accept (either one card, both cards,
or no cards). Then consumers (who wish to buy a single unit from each monopoly retailer)
decide for each retailer whether to use the retailer’s chosen card (if that shop accepts a single
card) or, if both cards are accepted, which card to use. Thus, there is an asymmetry in the
model: retailers …rst decide which cards to accept, and then consumers decide which of these
acceptable card to use (if any).
A retailer deciding between taking one or both cards faces a trade-o¤. If it accepts a
single card (the card with a high intrinsic bene…t or a low charge) then its consumers have
a stark choice between paying by this card or not using a card at all. Alternatively, if it
accepts both cards then (i) more consumers will choose to pay by some card but (ii) fewer
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consumers will choose to use the retailer’s favoured card. If one card reduces its charge to
retailers, this will have two e¤ects: …rstly, it will cause some retailers who previously did not
use either card to join its network, and secondly, it will cause some retailers who previously
accepted both cards to accept only the low-charge card. The share of the charges that are
borne by the retailers then depends (in part) on how closely consumers view the two cards
as being substitutes. If consumers do not switch cards much in response to a price cut, then
consumers should pay a large share of the total transaction charge; if consumers view the
cards are close substitutes, then the retailers will bear most of the charges in equilibrium.
Rochet and Tirole also consider the case where there are …xed fees as well as per-
transaction fees. In this case, whether a consumer decides to use a given card depends upon
the number of retailers who accept the card. (This feature was absent from their benchmark
model with per-transaction payo¤s.) They make the simplifying assumption that consumers
choose to use only a single card (if any). I will describe a somewhat similar model (where
the chosen application is to shopping malls) in section 5.5 below.
No single, transparent model can hope to encompass all the features of the above ex-
amples. Therefore, in the following sections we present three models that cover a variety
of plausible situations. First is the benchmark case of a single intermediary (section 3).
Second is the case of competing intermediaries, but in the special case where both sides of
the market deal with only a single intermediary (section 4). Third is the case where one side
of the market deals exclusively with a single intermediary, while the other group deals with
all intermediaries in an attempt to gain access to all agents on the other side (section 5).
3 Monopoly Intermediation
Here we present an analysis of monopoly intermediation.
This framework does not apply to most of the examples listed in the Introduction. How-
ever, perhaps some conferences might …t into this framework, historically “yellow pages” was
e¤ectively a monopoly of the incumbent telephone company, and some shopping malls are
far enough away from others that the monopoly paradigm might be appropriate.
This section is closely related to section 2 of Rochet and Tirole (2001).7 There are two
7The two main di¤erences with their analysis are the following. First, in the present model the level
of participation is determined by the total surplus ul = ®lnm ¡ pl, whereas in Rochet and Tirole (2001)
participation is determined by the ‘surplus per transaction’, which in our notation means that
nl = Ál(®l ¡ pl=nm) :
This essentially means that participation decisions on one side do not depend on the number of participants
on the other side (although the surplus does depend on the number on the other side).
Second, Rochet and Tirole (2001) assume that costs are incurred on a ‘per-transaction’ basis, i.e. they
are proportional to n1n2, whereas I assume they are incurred on a per-participant basis, i.e., costs are
n1f1 + n2f2. One feature of this modelling approach is that costs are associated directly with participation,
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Figure 1: Monopoly Intermediation
groups of agents, l = 1; 2. If the “utility” (to be de…ned) o¤ered to group l is ul, suppose
that the number of group l who participate is
nl = Ál(ul)
for some increasing function Ál. Here, utility is determined by
ul = ®lnm¡ pl ;
so that a member of group l enjoys additional utility ®l from each member of the other group
m. Here pi is the intermediary’s charge to a group i participant. The intermediary incurs a
…xed cost of serving a group l participant of fl. If we consider the intermediary as o¤ering
utilities fulg rather than prices fplg, then the implicit price for group l is pl = ®lnm¡ ul =
®lÁm(um) ¡ ul. Therefore, the intermediary’s pro…t is
¼ = [®1Á2(u2)¡ u1 ¡ f1]Á1(u1) + [®2Á1(u1)¡ u2 ¡ f2]Á2(u2) :
and so it is possible to discuss which group subsidizes the other, whereas this is not so straightforward in
the Rochet-Tirole framework. See also Parker and Van Alstyne (2000) for related analysis of the monopoly
model.
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Let consumer surplus of group l be vl(ul), where v0l(ul) ´ Ál(ul). Then total welfare is
w = ¼+ v1(u1) + v2(u2) :
Notice that both the pro…t maximizing and welfare maximizing outcomes depend only on
the sum of externality parameters, ® = ®1+®2. It is easily veri…ed that the …rst-best welfare
maximizing outcome involves utilities satisfying:
ul = ®Ám(um) ¡ fl :
Or, since implicit prices are pl = ®lÁm(um)¡ ul, we have that socially optimal prices are
pl = fl¡ ®mÁm(um) : (1)
As one would expect, prices should ideally be set below cost (if ®m > 0) to take account of
the externality enjoyed by the other side of the market. The pro…t-maximizing prices, by
contrast, satisfy
pl = fl ¡ ®mÁm(um) + 1´l ; (2)
where
´l(ul) ´ Á
0
l(ul)
Ál(ul)
> 0
measures the responsiveness of participation to increases in utility for group l. Expression
(2) states that the pro…t-maximizing prices are set above the …rst-best levels by a factor
inversely related to the elasticity of participation. It is possible that the pro…t-maximizing
outcome might involve group l being o¤ered a subsidised service, i.e., pl < fl. From (2), this
happens if the elasticity of participation ´l is very large and/or if the external bene…t ®m
enjoyed by the other group is large.
Finally, consider the Ramsey prices, i.e., the prices that maximize surplus subject to the
…rm just breaking even. (From (1), the …rst-best prices are both below cost, and so will
cause the …rm to run at a loss.) These Ramsey prices are
pl = fl ¡ ®mÁm(um) + ¸´l(ul) (3)
where 0 · ¸ · 1 is chosen that the …rm just breaks even, i.e., so that
Á1
·
¸
´i
¡ ®2Á2
¸
+ Á2
·
¸
´2
¡ ®1Á1
¸
= 0 ;
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i.e.,
¸ =
®Á1Á2
Á1=´1 + Á2=´2
:
Therefore, from (3) we obtain
pl ¡ fl = ®´ l
Á1Á2
Á1=´1+ Á2=´2
¡ ®mÁm = Ám
·
®
Ál=´ l
Á1=´1 + Á2=´2
¡®m
¸
: (4)
By construction, (except for knife-edge cases) one side of the market must be subsidised at
the expense of the other in the Ramsey problem. From (4), it is group l rather than group
m that is subsidised if
Ál
´l®m
< Ám
´m®l
:
This is the case when (i) group l is the more ‘elastically supplied’ (all else equal) or (ii) group
l causes the greater external bene…t to the other group than vice versa (all else equal). For
instance, if group 1 essentially enjoys no bene…t from interacting with group 2 (®1 ¼ 0) then
group 1 should certainly be subsidised at the Ramsey optimum. (This would not necessarily
be true in the case of pro…t maximization.)
4 Two-Sided Exclusive Intermediation
The second model involves competing intermediaries, but assumes that, for exogenous rea-
sons, each participant (from either group) chooses to join just a single intermediary.
This assumption is too extreme to be strictly applicable in most circumstances. But it
is relevant, for instance, for:
² Example 1, if for some reason speakers and listeners only attended a single conference
over the relevant period.
² Example 3, since students and teachers belong to a single institution.
² Example 5, when columnists are exclusively employed by a newspaper and when people
read a single newspaper.
² Example 8, if consumers only visited a single mall (which is quite plausible) and re-
tailers only located in a single mall (less plausible, especially for chainstores).
² Example 11, if workers and …rms located in a single region.
² Example 13, if, instead of dating agencies, we think about ‘dating bars’ and where
people do not visit more than one bar in the relevant period.
² Example 14, since diners only go to a single restaurant at a time.
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Figure 2: Competitive Exclusive Intermediation
4.1 The Model
The model is made up of the following ingredients, which extend the previous monopoly
model in the obvious way. There are two groups of participants, 1 and 2. (These will be
denoted l orm as before.) There are two intermediaries, A and B, who enable the participants
to interact. (These will be denoted i or j .) Suppose that intermediary i o¤ers a group m
participant a utility level uim. Intermediaries compete for market share within each group. If
group m is o¤ered the choice of utilities uAm and uBm from the two intermediaries, the number
who go to intermediary i is given by the familiar Hotelling speci…cation:
nim =
1
2
+
uim¡ ujm
2tm
: (5)
Here, tm is the di¤erentiation parameter for groupm (which might di¤er for the two groups).
Next we describe how the utilities uim are determined. The crucial ingredient is that a
member of group l cares about the number of members of the other group m who go to
the same intermediary. (For simplicity, we ignore the possibility that a member of group l
cares also about the number of members of group l who go to the same intermediary—see
Appendix A for a generalized version of this model, which allows for this possibility, as well
as the case with more than two groups of participants.) Therefore, utilities are determined in
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the following way: if intermediary i has a number nim of group m participants as customers,
the utility of a group l member at this intermediary is
uil = ®lnim¡ pil ; (6)
where pil is the price the intermediary charges a group l member for its services. The
parameter ®l measures the inter-group externality for group l participants.
We suppose that the network externality parameters ®l are ‘small’ compared to the di¤er-
entiation parameters tl so that we can focus on symmetric equilibria where each intermediary
captures half the market for both groups of participants. (If this were not the case, the net-
work externality e¤ects could outweigh brand preferences, and there would exist equilibria
where one intermediary corners both sides of the market.)
Suppose that intermediaries A and B o¤er the four prices (pA1 ; pA2 ) and (pB1 ; pB2 ).8 Then
solving the simultaneous equations (5) and (6) implies (eventually) that
ni1 =
1
2
+
1
2
®1(pj2 ¡ pi2) + t2(pj1 ¡ pi1)
t1t2 ¡ ®1®2 ; n
i
2 =
1
2
+
1
2
®2(pj1 ¡ pi1) + t1(pj2 ¡ pi2)
t1t2 ¡ ®1®2 : (7)
(Assume that brand preferences are more important than network e¤ects in the sense that
t1t2 ¡ ®1®2 > 0.) The expressions (7) are perhaps the central insight needed to solve this
model. To get some insight into where the expressions come from, the following thought
experiment seems useful. Suppose that …rm i decreases its price to group 1 by an amount
", say. Consider this ‘adaptive expectations’ story to infer the total e¤ect on its customer
numbers for the two groups:
1. The direct utility of A’s group 1 members immediately increases by the price reduction
";
2. From (5), A immediately attracts a further "=2t1 group 1 customers;
3. From (6), the relative utility to group 2 members from being at A rather than B
increases by "®2=t1;
4. As a result, A attracts a further "®2=(2t2t1) group 2 customers;
5. The relative utility to group 1 member from being at A increases by "®1®2=(t1t2);
6. A attracts a further "®1®2=(2t1t1t2) group 1 customers;
7. The relative utility to group 2 members from being at A increases by "®2®1®2=(t1t1t2)
which causes A to attract a further "®2®1®2=(2t2t1t1t2) group 2 customers, and so on
ad in…nitum.
8Thus we assume that the intermediaries compete in prices, rather than utilities, say. The choice of
strategic variable makes a di¤erence to the outcome. See section 2 of Armstrong (2002a) for a comparison
of the outcomes when …rms compete in prices or compete in utilities in two-sided markets.
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Therefore, the total increase in group 1 customers as a result of this price reduction is
"
2t1
(
1 +
®1®2
t1t2
+
µ
®1®2
t1t2
¶2
+ :::
)
= "
t2
t1t2 ¡®1®2 :
This gives the own-price elasticity of demand in (7), and a similar in…nite series yields the
corresponding cross-price elasticity. (This thought experiment also makes clear why we need
t1t2 ¡®1®2 > 0 for this process to converge. If say, the two …rms o¤er the same initial price
pair, and one …rm slightly reduced one of its prices, then the above “feedback loop” would
mean that that …rm captured all members of both groups.)
Turning to the cost side, suppose that an intermediary has a …xed cost fl for serving a
member of group l. Therefore, pro…ts for intermediary i are
¼i = (pi1 ¡ f1)ni1 + (pi2 ¡ f2)ni2
or
¼i = (pi1 ¡ f1)
"
1
2
+ 1
2
®1(pj2 ¡ pi2) + t2(pj1 ¡ pi1)
t1t2 ¡ ®1®2
#
+(pi2 ¡ f2)
"
1
2
+ 1
2
®2(pj1 ¡ pi1) + t1(pj2 ¡ pi2)
t1t2 ¡®1®2
#
:
Further manipulations show that the symmetric equilibrium consists of the following prices
p1 = f1 + t1 ¡ ®2 ; p2 = f2 + t2 ¡ ®1 : (8)
Therefore, the price-cost margin for group l is tl¡®m, i.e., the equilibrium price-cost margin
for a particular group is equal to the di¤erentiation parameter for that group (which repre-
sents how ‘competitive’ that side of the market is), minus the externality that joining the
intermediary has on the other group who have joined the intermediary. Thus, an intermedi-
ary will target one group more aggressively than the other if that group is (i) on the more
competitive side of the market and/or (ii) causes larger bene…ts to the other group than vice
versa.
Each intermediary makes total pro…t
¼ = 1
2
(t1 ¡ ®2)| {z }
pro…t from group 1
+ 1
2
(t2 ¡ ®1)| {z }
pro…t from group 2
:
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In particular, the cross-group network e¤ects acts to reduce pro…ts compared to the case
where ®1 = ®2 = 0, since …rms have an additional reason to compete hard for market share.
(This e¤ect is the same as that in the traditional “single-group” network e¤ects model.)
There is no scope for meaningful welfare analysis with this model since prices are just
transfers between agents: any (symmetric) pair of prices o¤ered by the two intermediaries
will yield the same level of total surplus.
4.2 Example: “Columnists and Readers”
This example can be analyzed by direct application of the model in section 4 above.9 Call
readers “group 1” and columnists “group 2”. Suppose that the unit cost of producing a
paper is f1 (where this does not depend on the number of columnists employed). Suppose
that there is no cost of employing a columnist (over and above their salary), i.e., that f2 = 0
in the model. Then expression (8) shows that the equilibrium cover price of a paper is
p1 = f1 + t1 ¡ ®2 ;
while the salary paid to a columnist is
s2 = ®1 ¡ t2 :
Thus, the fact that a columnist likes a wider readership (®2 > 0) is re‡ected not in a
reduction in his/her salary, but in a reduction of the price of the newspaper. As one would
expect, the more ‘competitive’ the market for columnists (t2) the greater the salary that
needs to be paid. More interestingly, there is a sense in which columnists are paid ‘too
much’: ignoring the component t2 (which could be small), their salary is ®1 which is the
bene…t they would cause to the entire population of readers, not just the readers of their
chosen newspaper. (The bene…t to the readers of their newspaper is ®1=2.) The reason for
this apparently excessive rate of remuneration is the knowledge that, if the newspaper fails
to employ the columnist, the rival paper will do so, and this will disadvantage it in the battle
for readers.10
9As mentioned, this model is a variant of the “competition in inputs and outputs” models of Stahl
(1988) and Yanelle (1989) where (i) there is product di¤erentiation and (ii) there is no …xed relationship
between inputs and outputs. Section 3.2 of Spulber (1999) has a discussion of these models with product
di¤erentiation, although he continues to assume a …xed input-output relationship.
1 0The feature that exclusive content will command a premium in competitive media markets was also seen
in section 3 of Armstrong (1999).
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4.3 Example: Smokers and Non-Smokers
Consider two restaurants competing for diners. There are two groups of diners: (potential)
smokers and non-smokers. Smokers have utility
us =
8<: v¡ p if they can smokev¡ ± ¡ p if they can’t smoke
(Here v is the intrinsic utility from the meal, and p is the price for the meal. ± is the disutility
from not smoking. Non-smokers have utility
un =
8<: v¡ ®n
i
s¡ p if there are nis people actually smoking
v¡ p if no one is smoking
Both groups have Hotelling preferences for the two restaurants, and have the same ‘transport
cost’ parameter t. The fraction of smokers in the relevant population is ¸, and the likelihood
of being a smoker is uncorrelated with brand preference for restaurants. The cost of a meal
is f . Assume that restaurants cannot price discriminate on the basis of smoking, but rather
can choose whether or not to ban smoking. In general, the restaurant makes two decisions:
the price of a meal p and whether or not to allow smoking. However, for ease of exposition
suppose that prices are exogenously …xed (and symmetric).
If both restaurants follow the same policy—either both allow smoking or both forbid
it—then they will share the total market, and each will have a number of customers equal
to 12. Suppose one restaurant forbids smoking while the other permits it. Then the smoking
restaurant attracts a fraction
1
2
(1 + ±
t
) (9)
of the smokers, which then number
ns =
¸
2
(1 +
±
t
)
in all. In this case the utility of non-smokers at the smoking …rm is lower than at the
non-smoking …rm by a margin
®¸
2
(1 +
±
t
)
and so the smoking …rm obtains only a fraction
nn =
1
2
Ã
1¡
®¸
2 (1 +
±
t)
t
!
(10)
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of the non-smokers. (Note that for t small, so that the market is quite competitive, the
asymmetric policy will cause all the non-smokers to go to the non-smoking …rm, and all the
smokers to go to the smoking …rm.) In aggregate, then, the smoking …rm attracts a total
number of customers equal to
¸
2
(1 +
±
t
) +
1¡ ¸
2
Ã
1 ¡
®¸
2 (1 +
±
t )
t
!
:
This is less than 12 if
(1¡ ¸)®(1 + ±
t
) > 2± : (11)
In this case both restaurants operating a non-smoking policy is the equilibrium. Otherwise,
both restaurants permitting smoking is the equilibrium. (There can be no asymmetric equi-
librium in this particular model, since a …rm can always guarantee itself a share of diners
equal to 12 by copying the strategy of its rival.)
Consider next social welfare under the various policy combinations. Firms make the same
total pro…t in all cases, so their contribution to welfare can be ignored. If both …rms forbid
smoking, then total consumer welfare (including transport costs) is
WN = v¡ p ¡ t4 ¡ ¸± :
If both …rms permit smoking, then consumer welfare is
WS = v ¡ p¡ t4 ¡
(1 ¡¸)¸®
2 :
Clearly, WN > WS if (1 ¡ ¸)® > 2±.11 This is a stronger condition than that for the
equilibrium to be non-smoking in (11). Therefore, in this particular model we see that there
is scope for public policy intervention: it might be socially optimal to prohibit smoking in
restaurants when the equilibrium is to permit smoking (but never vice versa).12
1 1One might also consider welfare under an asymmetric policy, i.e., where exactly one restaurant permits
smoking. (This is never an equilibrium in this model.) Compared to the symmetric policies, the asymmetric
situation involves better ‘sorting’ between smokers and non-smokers (there are more smokers with smokers
and more non-smokers with non-smokers), but worse sorting between customers and restaurants (a customer
will sometimes have to travel further to her favored type of restaurant). If transport costs are small, then
the former e¤ect certainly dominates, and this is the optimal outcome.
1 2 I do not suggest taking this model too seriously. There are at least two problems with the model. First,
it is assumed that all non-smokers prefer to eat with smokers rather than not to go out at all. Second, a
model with free entry of restaurants is likely to have an asymmetric outcome: a fraction of restaurants will
allow smoking (perhaps a fraction similar to ¸, the proportion of smokers in the dining population) while
the remainder will forbid it.
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5 One-Sided Exclusive Intermediation: “Competitive
Bottlenecks”
Next suppose that, while group 1 continues to deal with just a single intermediary, group 2
is happy to deal with both intermediaries.13
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Figure 3: Competitive Bottlenecks
Examples of this kind of market include:
² Example 2, where an author publishes an article to a single journal but where readers
typically subscribe to several journals.
² Example 6, if people tend to read a single newspaper (or, less plausibly, watch a single
TV channel), and where advertisers are willing to advertise in several outlets in order
to make contact with a large pool of potential consumers.
² Example 7, if people tend to consult a single “yellow pages” directory when they need
information about a particular service. As in the previous example, advertisers will
then tend to advertise in several outlets in order to have a good chance of reaching
most potential customers.
1 3The following model is essentially that of the mobile telephony market analyzed in section 3.1 of Arm-
strong (2002b), where the term “competitive bottlenecks” was used.
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² Example 8, if consumers tend to visit a single mall on a shopping trip (for instance,
because of transport costs). Retailers may choose to locate in several malls in order
to reach as many potential customers as possible. This example is, in technical terms,
di¤erent from most of the others listed here since it is natural to suppose that a retailer
has a …xed cost per mall, and this acts to complicate the analysis. (By contrast, it
seems less essential to model an advertiser as having a …xed cost of preparing an advert
per newspaper.)
² Example 9, if consumers tend to use a single credit card (perhaps because of transac-
tions costs of dealing with more than one card company). Retailers will most likely
wish to have the ability to handle transactions with a variety of cards. However, like
the previous mall example, it is plausible that …xed costs of being able to handle a
given card by retailers will be important.
² Example 10, if people tend to subscribe to a single, say, mobile network. People on,
say, the …xed network will then call people on all mobile networks.
² Example 13, if we think about real estate market where house sellers typically use
a single agent to sell the house, and where potential buyers use many agents when
looking for a house.
5.1 The Model
If intermediary i = A;B o¤ers utility ui1 to a member of group 1, while the rival o¤ers utility
uj1, then the former attracts a number
ni1 =
1
2
+
ui1 ¡ uj1
2t
(12)
of the group 1 members. Here, t is the relevant product di¤erentiation parameter. Unlike
the previous model, this model continues to work even in the competitive limit as t tends
to zero. These utilities are generated in the following way: if a quantity Xi of the group 2’s
“output” is available via intermediary i, and a member of group 1 pays pi1 to join, then
ui1 = U(X
i) ¡ pi1 (13)
where U is some increasing function. (Because group 2 members deal with both interme-
diaries, it does not make sense to talk about the ‘number’ of group 2 members on a given
intermediary, and so we use the term ‘quantity’. To be concrete, think of group 1 as readers
of newspapers or yellow pages, and group 2 as advertisers placing a given quantity Xi of
advertising in the outlet i.) Turning to group 2, suppose that if there are ni1 members of
group 1 at intermediary i, then the aggregate utility of group 2 if it supplies quantity X to
the intermediary is
ni1V (X) ¡ pi2X (14)
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where pi2 is the intermediary’s price per unit of X and V is some (concave) function of its
output. Thus group 2 enjoys utility from dealing with intermediary i that is proportional to
i’s group 1 customer base. Clearly, from (14) the equilibrium quantity choice by group 2 at an
intermediary depends only on that intermediary’s price per group 1 member, pi2=ni1, and not
on either (i) the number of group 1 members at the intermediary or (ii) on the terms o¤ered
by the other intermediary. Therefore, it makes sense to de…ne an intermediary’s “revenue
from group 2 per group 1 customer”, which we de…ne to be R(X) if group 2 supplies quantity
X. In fact,
R(X) ´ XV 0(X)
since V 0(X) is group 2’s inverse demand function (per group 1 member), i.e., the price per
group 1 member that causes quantity X to be supplied by group 2.
Suppose that an intermediary incurs a total cost that depends on group 2’s quantity X
and the number of its group 1 customers. Suppose for simplicity this cost is proportional
to ni1, and so the total cost to intermediary i is ni1C(X ). (For instance, in the yellow pages
example, C(X) is the cost of producing a directly of size X.) Therefore, the total pro…t of
intermediary i is
¼i = ni1(pi1 + R(Xi) ¡ C(Xi)) : (15)
Intermediary i o¤ers group 1 customers a price pi1 and a group 2 quantity Xi. Equiv-
alently, i o¤ers group 1 customers a utility ui1 and a quantity Xi, in which case expression
(13) implies that (15) becomes
¼i = ni1(U (Xi) + R(Xi) ¡ C(X i) ¡ ui1) : (16)
Clearly, regardless of the level of utility it chooses to o¤er its group 1 customers, it will
choose the group 2 quantity X¤ satisfying
X¤ maximizes S(X ) ´ U(X) + R(X) ¡ C(X) : (17)
The function S(X) measures the total surplus available to group 1 customers and the in-
termediary, per group 1 customer, when quantity X is supplied from group 2. The crucial
point to note is that group 2 output is chosen to maximize the total surplus enjoyed by the
intermediaries and group 1 participants together. (The interests of group 2 are ignored in
the calculation.)
Turning next to competition for group 1 customers, i.e., to how the surplus S(X¤) is
divided between intermediaries and group 1 participants, using (12) and (16) we see that i’s
total pro…t is
¼i =
Ã
1
2
+
ui1 ¡ uj1
2t
!
(S(X¤)¡ ui1) : (18)
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It is then straightforward to see that the Nash equilibrium level of group 1 utility, u1, is
given by
u1 = S(X¤) ¡ t :
The equilibrium pro…t made by an intermediary is the standard Hotelling pro…t ¼ = 12t.
From (13), the equilibrium price to group 1 members is p1 = t+ U(X¤)¡ S(X¤), or
p1 = C(X ¤) + t¡R(X ¤) : (19)
Thus, the equilibrium price for group 1 participants is the standard ‘Hotelling’ price (t +
C(X¤)) minus the revenue that a group 1 member generates for the intermediary from group
2.
Clearly, it is perfectly possible that group 1 members are subsidised by group 2, in the
sense that p1 < C(X¤), and from (19) this inevitably occurs if the market for group 1
customers is highly competitive (t ! 0). Indeed, it is possible that p1 in (19) is negative.
If negative prices are not feasible, then the equilibrium will then involve charging group 1
customers nothing for the service, something which is often seen in some of our examples
(yellow pages, shopping malls, and so on).
Turning to overall welfare, social welfare (per group 1 member) is
w = V (X) ¡R(X)| {z }
surplus of group 2
+ S(X) = V (X) +U (X) ¡ C(X) : (20)
Clearly, this involves a higher level of group 2 output than that at the competitive equilib-
rium, X ¤, since now the surplus of group 2 members (V (X) ¡R(X)) is taken into account.
(This group 2 surplus is increasing in its output X.) Even though intermediaries might
compete vigorously for group 1 members, there is no competition for providing access by
group 2 to these group 1 members, and this monopoly induces the usual excessive pricing.
The market failure is not one of excessive pro…ts—the intermediaries’ overall pro…ts will be
small if t is small—but rather that there is a bad pattern of relative prices for the two groups
of participants.
Free service to group 1 : There are several cases where it is natural to assume that group 1
can consume the service for free. (Examples include yellow pages, which are typically given
free to users, and shopping malls, where consumer typically have free access to the mall.) In
this case the only that an intermediary can compete for group 1 customers is by o¤ering a
high quantity X. Speci…cally, if the two group 2 quantities are Xi and Xj, …rm i will get
ni1 =
1
2
+
U(Xi)¡ U(Xj)
2t
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group 1 customers. In this case pro…t in (18) is modi…ed to be
¼i =
µ
1
2
+
U(Xi) ¡ U(Xj)
2t
¶
(R(X i) ¡ C(Xi)) : (21)
One can then show that the …rst-order condition for the symmetric equilibrium quantity X^
is given by
U 0(X^)[R(X^) ¡ C(X^ )] + t[R0(X^) ¡ C0(X^)] = 0 : (22)
Since we must have R > C if the …rm’s are to be pro…table, this condition shows that
R0 > C0 at the equilibrium choice of quantity. This is greater than the quantity that would
be chosen for …xed group 1 shares (where each …rm would choose X to maximize its pro…t
R(x)¡C(x)). This is to be expected since the …rms need to o¤er a high quantity to attract
group 1 customers. However, the comparison of the quantity X^ with the quantity X¤ in
(17), i.e., when group 1 agents pay a fee, does not seem to be straightforward. In competitive
markets, where t ¼ 0, (22) shows that the equilibrium will involve …rms choosing quantities
so that revenue just covers costs: R(X^) = C(X^).
5.2 Example: Academic Publishing
This section presents a simple model of the market for academic publishing. The focus is
entirely on the publishing part of the process, and not on the certi…cation (and other) parts
of the process that are also important. It is arguable that new technology has meant that
the costs of dissemination have fallen so much that certi…cation has become the central role
of academic journals. If so, then the following simple model applies to a previous era.
Suppose that an author has an article to disseminate. If n people read the article and
he pays a dissemination (or ‘submission’) fee P , the author’s utility is bn¡ P . Therefore, b
represents the author’s (constant) per-reader bene…t when the paper is read. Journals have
technology such that the cost of dissemination per article takes the form f + cn, where f is
a …xed cost per article and c is the per-reader cost of dissemination.
5.2.1 No competition between articles
If p is the fee for reading the article (or the ‘subscription fee’), write N(p) for the number of
readers of the paper and V (p) for the associated reader surplus function (V 0 ´ ¡N). Notice
that each article is, for the moment, assumed to be an independent market, and a reader’s
decision about whether to read one article has no e¤ect on his decision to read another.
A journal’s pro…ts from a given article are then
¼ = pN(p)| {z }
revenue from readers
+ P|{z}
revenue from authors
¡ [cN(p) + f]| {z } :
costs
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Suppose that competition between journals drives their pro…ts to zero.
In this market, journals compete for submissions in terms of the submission fee and the
number of readers the article will have. Therefore, the optimal two-sided pricing policy for
journals is to maximize author surplus bN (p)¡P subject to the journal break-even constraint
(p¡ c)N(p) +P ¡ f ¸ 0. Clearly, this has the solution in which the subscription fee
p maximizes (p¡ c)N(p) + bN(p) :
(The submission fee P is then chosen so that the journal just breaks even.) Thus the journal
behaves as a monopoly with marginal cost [c¡b] facing the demand curve N(p). In particular,
the reading price p is strictly above this adjusted marginal cost, so that p > c¡ b.
By contrast, social welfare is maximized when
p maximizes (p ¡ c)N (p) + bN (p) + V (p)
which has the solution
p = c ¡ b :
Thus this market equilibrium involves too high a reading price (and so too low a submission
fee) compared to the social optimum. (Of course, this is the exactly the outcome that would
occur if an author could disseminate his article himself, if he had access to the technology
with cost-of-dissemination f + cn.) Notice that the fact that authors like people to read
their articles does not mitigate the fundamental problem of monopoly in this industry. An
increase in b causes both the privately optimal reading price and the socially optimal reading
price to fall. This model is essentially an instance of the general model in section 5 above.
5.2.2 Competition between articles
The above stark model can be generalized in the following manner. The population of readers
has size normalized to 1. Each reader only has time to read, say, m articles. Assume for
now that all articles are the same quality and that there are more than m potential articles
available. Therefore, readers will choose the m articles with the lowest subscription fees (and
randomize if there are ties). It is then easily veri…ed that the equilibrium in this market
is to set the submission fee to extract the authors’ surplus, so that P = b, and to set the
subscription fee so that costs are just covered:
p = c+ f ¡ b :
This equilibrium involves journals pricing low to attract readers, and extracting all surplus
from authors.
A more general model along these lines is the following. Suppose authors are distinguished
by two parameters: q is the (unambiguous) quality of their article, and b (as before) is how
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much the author wishes to get published (it is exactly how much the author would be willing
to pay to get his article published in a journal with wide readership). The parameter q is
measured in money terms, and if a reader reads a quality-q article for the fee p, his net
surplus is q ¡ p. Notice that q + b represents the total bene…t in publishing the type–(q; b)
article.
Suppose that ¹u is the equilibrium net surplus for readers of the marginal article. That
is to say, if a journal publishes an article generating net surplus q ¡ p > ¹u it will certainly
attract all readers. Then, given ¹u, a journal will be able pro…tably to publish any article of
type (q; b) such that
q + b ¸ ¹u+ [c + k] :
The utility ¹u will then be determined so that the total number of articles that people want
to read (m in this speci…c model) equals the number supplied:
¹u satis…es # {articlies such that q + b ¸ ¹u + [c+ k]} =m :
Authors with type (q; b) strictly above this line will have strictly positive surplus. (Again,
all journals have zero pro…t.) The predictions of this speci…c model are
² There will be a menu of ‘journals’ o¤ering di¤ering combinations of article quality q
and subscription fee p, but all satisfying q ¡ p = ¹u. High quality journals have a high
subscription fee.
² Higher quality journals have a lower submission fee, so that P = c+k+¹u¡q: Therefore,
an author will send his article to the highest quality journal that is feasible.
² There is no market failure, since the articles with the highest social value (i.e., q + b)
are published. The ‘externality’ factor b is fully internalized by authors’ submission
decisions. If an author has a low q/high b combination, he will send the article to a
low quality journal and pay a high submission fee. He is willing to pay the high fee
since he enjoys a high private bene…t from getting published. The journal can attract
readers since the high submission fee is passed along to readers in the form of a low
subscription fee (which compensates for the low quality of its articles).
5.3 Example: Advertising in Media Markets
Suppose there are two newspapers, A and B, and that the cost of producing and distributing
the newspaper is f per copy (regardless of the number of adverts). Adverts are placed by
monopoly producers of new goods. A reader will purchase one unit of a given new good if
the price is less than her valuation and she sees an advert for the product. Producers are
di¤erentiated by the parameter ¾: the type-¾ producer has a good for which all consumers are
willing to pay ¾ (if they see an advert). In particular, due to the unit demand assumption and
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that fact that there is no asymmetric information about willingness-to-pay for new products,
the equilibrium price for a type-¾ new product will be ¾. Suppose that costs of the new
products are normalized to zero. Then, an advert placed in a newspaper is worth ¾ per reader
to the type-¾ …rm.14 Readers will, in equilibrium, gain no bene…t from seeing adverts, since
all their surplus is extracted by the monopoly price. Let F (¾) be the cumulative distribution
function for ¾ in the population of producers.
5.3.1 Readers buy a single newspaper
This section is based on Anderson and Coate (2001) and concerns the case where newspapers
have to compete for readers. The problem can be analyzed using the general model discussed
in section 5 above. Suppose that if the newspaper cover prices are pA and pB respectively,
then newspaper i obtains
ni =
1
2
+
pj ¡ pi
2t
readers. The crucial assumption here is that readers buy one or other newspaper, but not
both. Since readers gain no bene…t from advertising in this model, they do not care about
the amount of advertising in their paper, and so this does not enter into the market share
formula above. (Using the notation of section 5, Xi is the number of producers who choose
to advertise with paper i, and reader utility of advertising is identically zero, i.e., U(Xi) ´ 0.
Also, the per paper unit cost does not depend on advertising volume: C(Xi) ´ f .) Suppose
that newspaper i charges ai per reader to an advertiser/producer. (We suppose that papers
cannot discriminate between producers of di¤erent type when they set their advertising
rates.) In this case, a producer will agree to advertise if and only if ¾ ¸ ai. Thus, a
newspaper’s advertising revenue per reader with the charge ai is
R^(ai) = ai (1¡ F (ai)) :
Since the amount of advertising does not a¤ect the attraction of its newspaper to readers,
a newspaper might as well choose its advertising charge to maximize its revenue per reader,
i.e. to set the charge a¤ that maximizes R^(¢). This is just a special case of the formula (17)
above when U(X ) ¡ C(X) is constant. (Note, in this case it is more convenient to write
revenue as a function of price a rather than quantity X.)
1 4Thus, this model assumes that an advertiser’s payo¤ is linear in the number of people who see the advert.
There are at least two reasons why this linearity assumption might be unrealistic. First, Chwe (1998) presents
a model where an advertiser’s payo¤ is convex in the number of people who see the advert. (The model is
one where there are network e¤ects in consuming the advertised product, and if many people see the advert
this might act to change consumer expectations and to move to another equilibrium.) Second, if a seller has
limited supplies of the product available for sale (or, more generally, if the cost of production is convex),
then the seller only obtains bene…t from the advert reaching a certain number of potential consumers.
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A newspaper’s e¤ective cost per reader is now f ¡ R^(a¤), and so the equilibrium price
for readers is given by the usual Hotelling mark-up rule:
pA = pB = f ¡ R^(a¤) + t :
(Again, this is just a special case of (19).) If R^(a¤) > t then p < f and newspapers are
o¤ered for sale below their marginal cost f. The revenue from advertising is passed onto
readers in the form of low newspaper charges. The total pro…t made by the newspapers is t
(which is exactly the same as if there were no advertising at all). The total pro…t made by
the producers is V^ (a), where
V^ 0(a) = ¡ (1¡ F (a)) :
(In particular, V^ is decreasing.) The consumer surplus of readers (ignoring transport costs)
is ¡(f ¡ R^(a) + t). Therefore, total welfare in this market is
W (a) = R^(a) + V^ (a)
which is maximized at a = 0. Market equilibrium, by contrast, involves a maximizing R^(¢)
which will imply a strictly positive charge for advertising. Therefore, the market equilibrium
involves too little advertising. Moreover, this distortion is not mitigated by making the
market for readers more competitive (i.e., reducing t).
5.3.2 Overlapping readership
The previous model was somewhat extreme, especially if applied to television (where viewers
will watch several di¤erent channels over the relevant time frame). Suppose next that the
newspapers are independent products rather than substitutes, and so papers do not compete
directly for readers. Therefore, a fraction of the population will read both newspapers.
The fact that some readers buy both papers means that neither side of the market is
characterized by an exclusive choice of intermediary, and so none of the general models in
this paper apply to this case. Therefore, to analyze this case in a very partial and preliminary
way, consider the following model. Suppose that the fraction of the relevant population who
read newspaper i is n(pi), and that this fraction does not depend on the price for paper
j. Suppose that if the newspapers have readerships nA and nB then the number who read
both newspapers is given by some function Á(nA; nB). The function Á captures the extent
of correlation in newspaper buying across the population of readers. If a reader’s valuation
for paper i is statistically independent of her valuation for j, then Á(nA; nB) = nAnB.
On the other hand, if valuations are perfectly positively correlated among readers, then
Á(nA; nB) = minfnA; nBg. Clearly, newspaper i has ni ¡ Á(nA; nB) exclusive readers.
A producer only needs a consumer to see its advert once to make a sale. (This model
does not involve ‘persuasive’ advertising, where repeated sight of an advert might result in
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Figure 4: Overlapping Readership
greater likelihood of sale.) Consider …rst the situation where the two papers have readerships
nA and nB. What are the equilibrium charges to advertisers? Suppose the two lump-sum
charges for advertising are PA and PB. A producer then has four options: not to advertise
at all (which yields zero pro…ts), to advertise only in paper A, to advertise only in paper B,
or to advertise in both outlets. If it advertises only in paper i, the type-¾ …rm’s pro…t is
¾ni ¡ Pi
and if it advertises in both outlets its pro…t is
¾ [nA + nB ¡ Á] ¡ PA ¡ PB :
Use the subscript ‘max’ to denote the paper with higher value of ni¾¡Pi, and ‘min’ for the
other paper: Then, if an advertiser chooses to use only a single outlet it will choose paper
‘max’. A producer will choose to use both outlets, rather than just outlet ‘max’, provided
that
¾[nmin ¡ Á] ¸ Pmin :
In sum, a type-¾ producer will choose to advertise at least in paper ‘max’ if
¾nmax ¸ Pmax ;
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and it will choose to advertise in both outlets if the stronger condition
¾[nmin ¡ Á] ¸ Pmin
holds.
For simplicity, suppose that all producers have the same quality product ¾.15 Then the
equilibrium is for each paper to extract advertising revenue for access to its exclusive readers,
so that
Pi = ¾[ni ¡ Á(nA; nB)] : (23)
(When both papers set this advertising charge then producers choose to place adverts in
both papers. If one paper deviates by setting a higher charge it will lose all its advertisers;
if it deviates by setting a lower charge then it will not attract any more advertising and will
obtain less revenue from its existing advertisers.) In e¤ect, competition between newspapers
for advertising means that each newspaper i generates revenue only from its exclusive readers.
(By contrast, in the previous analysis where readers read a single paper, the papers could
charge ¾ per reader. Here paper i can charge only (1 ¡ Á=ni)¾ per reader.)
Having solved the second stage of the game, let us consider the …rst stage: pricing to
attract readers. If paper i charges the cover price pi, obtains readership ni while its rival has
nj readers, its total pro…t is
¼i = ni(pi ¡ k) +Pi
= ni(pi ¡ f)| {z }
pro…t from readers
+ ¾[ni ¡ Á(nA; nB)]| {z }
revenue from advertisers
: (24)
Perfect correlation: Consider …rst the extreme case where Á = minfnA; nBg. Then the only
way that a paper has any exclusive readers, and hence gets any revenue from advertising, is
if it sells more copies than its rival. Each reader it attracts in excess of its rival generates
advertising revenue ¾.
There is no symmetric equilibrium in this example. To see this, let p¤ maximize n(p)(p¡
f). Thus p¤ is the pro…t-maximizing cover price in the absence of any advertising. Both
papers setting the price p = p¤ is not an equilibrium, since it pays one paper to undercut the
other in order to obtain some advertising revenue. (There is a second-order loss in pro…t from
readers, but a …rst-order gain in revenue from advertising.) But neither is both …rms setting
the same price p^ < p¤ an equilibrium. (Neither paper obtains any advertising revenue, and
so it would bene…t a paper to increase its cover price to p¤ to maximize its pro…ts from
readers.) Let p¤¤ be the price that maximizes
n(p)(p¡ f) + ¾[n(p)¡ n(p¤)] :
1 5The calculation of the equilibrium advertising charges with heterogeneous producers seems to be com-
plicated, and equilibrium might not exist at all.
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(Clearly, this price is strictly lower than p¤. It is the price that maximizes n(p)(p¡ [f ¡¾]),
i.e., the monopoly price with a reduced unit cost level.) It is then veri…ed that one paper
setting the price p = p¤ and the other setting the price p = p¤¤ is an asymmetric equilibrium.
(By construction, p¤¤ is a best response to a rival price p¤. It is easily veri…ed that the reverse
holds as well.) The prediction of this (ex ante symmetric) model is therefore an asymmetric
outcome: one …rm has a lower cover price, a larger readership and obtains some advertising
revenue; the other has a high price, low readership and no advertising. The “advertising”
paper makes greater pro…ts (since it could choose the price p = p¤ if it wanted).16
General case: Since ni = n(pi), from (24) the …rst-order condition for symmetric Nash
equilibrium in this market is
n0(p ¡ f) + n + n0[1 ¡ Á1]¾ = 0 (25)
where Á1 = @Á=@ni < 1. This again implies a lower cover price than would be the case
without advertising (where the cover price would maximize n(p)(p ¡ f)), and so the need
to compete for advertising makes newspapers also ‘compete’ for readers, even when they
operate in entirely separate markets for readers. The reason is that, even though the total
number of readers a newspaper attracts does not depend on its rival’s strategy, the number
of exclusive readers does depend (negatively) on its rival’s readership.
The surplus of producers is their sales revenue, which is (2n¡Á)¾, minus their advertising
outlay, which is 2(n¡ Á)¾, and so this surplus is Á¾. In e¤ect, where newspaper readership
overlaps, which happens for a fraction Á of the population, competition implies that a pro-
ducer obtains access to these readers for free. (It must, however, pay the monopoly rate ¾
for the exclusive readers.)
Welfare e¤ects : Total welfare when both newspapers charge the cover price p and sell ad-
vertising is
W = 2v(p)| {z }
consumer surplus
+ 2n(p)(p¡ f ) + ¾ [2n(p)¡ Á(n(p); n(p))]| {z }
joint pro…t of newspapers and producers
:
The …rst-order condition (25) is actually the …rst-order condition that maximizes joint pro…ts
in the above expression.17 This is quite intuitive: the pro…t ‘leakage’ that takes place when
papers compete for advertising all ‡ows to advertisers (not readers), and there is no distortion
in the overall size of pro…ts. Obviously the cover price p is too high in social terms, but this
is due entirely to the papers’ monopoly position in the market for readers, and the presence
of advertising indirectly bene…ts readers by its e¤ect on intensifying papers’ desire to obtain
exclusive readers.
1 6This asymmetric outcome is reminiscent of the results in Caillaud and Jullien (2002).
1 7Note that Á1 =
1
2
dÁ(n;n)
dn .
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5.4 Example: Yellow Pages
Suppose there are two rival producers of ‘yellow pages’, A and B.18 This market can be
discussed with a direct application of the model in section 5 above, with readers of directories
called “group 1” and the advertisers labelled “group 2”. The amount of advertising in
directory i is Xi. The utility of a consumer who buys directory i is
ui1 = U (Xi) ¡ pi1
where U is an increasing function and pi1 is the price for buying (or using) the directory.
(This price could be set equal to zero if directories have to be o¤ered for free to consumers.)
Assume that each consumer only uses a single directory. Suppose the number of consumers
who use directory i is given by the familiar Hotelling speci…cation:
ni1 =
1
2 +
ui1 ¡uj1
2t :
Suppose that the bene…t to advertisers is proportional to the readership of a directory.
Therefore, let R(X) be the revenue per reader if a directory sets the advertising charge so
that quantity X of advertising is demanded. Suppose that a directory of size X costs C(X )
per user to produce and distribute. Then expression (17) shows that, if users can be charged
for the directory, the equilibrium quantity of advertising will maximize U(X)+R(X)¡C(X )
and from (19) the price that users face is p1 = C(X)+ t¡R(X). Since there is no particular
reason to think that directories are intrinsically di¤erentiated, t is likely to be small. In this
case, the optimal price p1 is negative if the revenue that a user generates, R, exceeds the cost
of the directory, C. This could be a rationale for why directories are distributed for free.
A complicating factor which is relevant in this market is that directories are typically
given to people even if they are not used. Therefore, the cost C(X ) is incurred even if the
directory is just thrown away. In this case pro…t in (21) is modi…ed to be
¼i =
µ
1
2
+
U (Xi) ¡ U(Xj)
2t
¶
R(X i) ¡ C(Xi) :
One can then show that the …rst-order condition for the symmetric equilibrium advertising
quantity X^ is given by
U 0(X^)R(X^ ) + t[R0(X^)¡ 2C 0(X^ )] = 0 :
Clearly, in competitive markets (t ¼ 0) directories will run at a loss, since they do not recover
the cost involved in the duplicate directories.
1 8This model is adapted from the structural model proposed in section 4 of Rysman (2002). Rysman’s
model is more complicated in at least two ways: (i) he allows for the fact that the bene…t to advertisers
might not be strictly proportional to readership, and (ii) keeping readership constant, an advertiser prefers
to be in a directory with fewer other adverts. He also assumes that directories compete for advertising by
setting quantities rather than prices.
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5.5 Example: Shopping Malls
The following model ‘almost’ …ts into the one-sided exclusive intermediation model of section
5.1 above, except for the fact that shops have …xed costs of operation, and their payo¤ is
not directly proportional to the number of consumers. In particular, a shop will only locate
in a mall if a certain threshold number of consumers visit the mall, and this feature was not
present in the above model. This means that we have to do the analysis from scratch. In the
fact, this model is quite close to that presented in section 6 of Rochet and Tirole (2001).
Suppose there are two shopping malls. There are a large number of retailers, and suppose
that each has a monopoly position in its product. For modelling simplicity, suppose that
these …rms di¤er only in terms of the …xed costs of setting up a shop in a mall. In particular,
each visitor to a mall obtains utility v per shop in the mall, and each shop obtains pro…t ¼
from each visitor to the mall. The …xed cost of a “type µ” shop is just µ, and suppose the
number of shops with …xed cost less than µ is F (µ). (A shop must incur this cost twice if it
locates in both malls.) A mall charges each shop the same rent ps, say, and this is a …xed
charge (and is not an explicit function, say, of the number of consumers passing through or
of the shop’s turnover). If mall i has nic consumers and charges pis to shops, then a type-µ
shop is willing to participate if
µ + pis · ¼nic
and is willing to do this regardless of whether it chooses to locate also in the rival mall.19
Therefore, there will then be
nis = F (¼nic ¡ pis) (26)
shops locating in mall i.
Consumers are assumed only to go to a single mall. If their utility is uic at mall i, then
that mall will get
nic =
1
2
µ
1 +
uic ¡ ujc
t
¶
(27)
consumers. Consumer utility is given by
uic = vn
i
s¡ pic (28)
if the mall charges pic for entry.
The mall has a cost per shop of fs and a cost per consumer of fc. (Perhaps this latter
cost might represent the costs of providing su¢cient parking, and so on.) Therefore, the
pro…t of mall i is
nic(p
i
c ¡ fc) + nis(pis¡ fs) : (29)
1 9At least, this is true if shops are “atomistic”. If this were not the case then if a shop already located
in mall A decides to locate also in mall B , then this will draw consumers away from mall A and so cause a
negative externality on pro…ts from its mall A branch. Here, though, we ignore this possibility.
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First, we can simply derive the equilibrium charge to shops at a symmetric equilibrium. For
suppose that each mall has attracted half the population of consumers, and o¤ers equilibrium
consumer utility uc. Then a mall must be maximizing its pro…ts given this utility uc. In
other words, consider varying pic and nis so that uc = vnis ¡ pic is constant. Then from (29)
the mall’s pro…t is
1
2 (vn
i
s ¡ uc ¡ fc) + nis(pis ¡ fs) = 12(vF (
1
2¼ ¡ p
i
s) ¡ uc ¡ fc) +F (12¼ ¡ p
i
s)(pis ¡ fs) :
Maximizing this with respect to pis implies that the equilibrium charge to retailers is
ps = fs+
1
´
¡ v
2
(30)
where
´ =
F 0( 12¼ ¡ ps)
F ( 12¼ ¡ ps)
> 0
measures the proportional increase in the number of shops as pro…t opportunities increase.
The formula (30) expresses the pro…t-maximizing charge to shops as a standard “elasticity”
rule (p = f + 1=´) adjusted downwards the external bene…t that an additional shop causes
the consumers at the mall to enjoy (which is 12v when the malls share the consumer market
equally). If shops are in very elastic supply (i.e., 1=´ ¼ 0) or consumers greatly value each
shop (v is large) then it is optimal to subsidize shops (i.e., ps < fs) in order to extract surplus
from consumers.
However, the important thing to note is that this equilibrium charge to shops maximizes
the total surplus available to the consumers and the malls together. (This is precisely
analogous to expression (17) in section 5 above, where group 2’s contract was chosen to
maximize the surplus available to the intermediaries and the group 1 participants together.)
The interests of shops are ignored in this calculation.
Turning next to the equilibrium price charged to consumers, notice that
uic ¡ ujc = (pjc ¡ pic) + v(nis¡ njs)
= (pjc ¡ pic) + v
£
F (¼nic ¡ ps)¡ F (¼njc ¡ ps)
¤
= (pjc ¡ pic) + v
£
F (¼nic ¡ ps)¡ F (¼(1¡ nic) ¡ ps)
¤
:
Therefore, from (27), given the rival consumer price pjc, in order to attract a number nic of
consumers, mall i must charge the price
pic = pjc + t(1 ¡ 2nic) + v
£
F (¼nic ¡ ps) ¡ F (¼(1 ¡ nic)¡ ps)
¤
:
From (29) mall i will therefore choose nic in order to maximize
nic
©
pjc + t(1¡ 2nic) + v
£
F (¼nic ¡ ps)¡ F (¼(1¡ nic) ¡ ps)
¤ ¡ fcª
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+F (¼nic ¡ ps)(ps ¡ fs) :
At the symmetric equilibrium, the optimum must involve nic = 12, and so the equilibrium
charge to consumers is
pc = t+ fc ¡ F 0¼(v + ps¡ fs)
= t+ fc ¡ F 0¼(v2 +
1
´
))
= t+ fc ¡ ¼F ¡ 12v¼F
0 : (31)
This formula (31) expresses the consumer charge as a standard ‘Hotelling’ price (p = t+ f )
together with two downward adjustment terms. The …rst adjustment term, ¼F , represents
the external bene…t that an additional consumer gives to the shops located in the mall. The
second adjustment term, 12v¼F
0, represents the indirect spillover that an additional consumer
gives to the existing other consumers at the mall: an additional consumer causes more shops
to be located at the mall—an increase of ¼F 0 to be precise—and this causes the utility of
each existing consumer to increase by v per additional shop.
Welfare: Turning to welfare, given that half consumers visit each mall, social welfare per
mall with the charge to shops ps is
w =
v
2
F (
¼
2
¡ ps) + (ps¡ fs)F (¼2 ¡ ps) +
Z ¼
2¡ps
(
¼
2
¡ µ ¡ ps) dF (µ) :
Maximizing this gives the socially optimal charge to shops as
ps = fs ¡ v2 :
Thus, shops should be o¤ered mall space at subsidised rates because of the positive exter-
nality they exert on consumers. Comparing with (30), we see that equilibrium price for
retailing space is too high from a social point of view. Even though the details of the anal-
ysis di¤ers from that in section 5, the intuition for the market failure is the same in the two
cases: the fact that malls have to compete for consumers but not (directly) for shops means
that the equilibrium outcome as given in (30) maximizes the surplus available to malls and
shoppers and ignores the pro…ts of shops. Thus the e¤ect is as if the consumers/malls act
as a monopoly when setting terms for the shops.
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Competition within malls: An interesting issue is the equilibrium extent of competition
between shops within malls.20 Thus one could imagine the mall controlling the degree of
competition, e.g., the number of shops selling similar products, within the mall itself. In
the usual way, more competition will mean less pro…t per consumer for each shop but each
consumer will obtain higher surplus per shop (or per shop type). Thus we would expect
that if the mall allowed competition it would make less money from the retailing side of the
market but more from the consumer side (if it charged for entry). One hypothesis which
could be investigated is: malls would allow competition within the mall if consumers were
charged for entry, but if consumers had free entry that malls would restrict competition in
order to drive up revenues from shops.
5.6 Example: Call Termination in Telecommunications
Consider this stylized model of the market for mobile telephony, which uses the ‘competitive
bottlenecks’ framework of section 5. There are two mobile networks, A andB, that make calls
to, and receive calls from, the …xed telecom network.21 Here, ‘group 1’ are the subscribers
on the mobile networks and ‘group 2’ are people on the …xed network who wish to make
calls to these mobile subscribers. Subscribers decide to join one or other mobile network
but not both. If utility o¤ered to subscribers on mobile network i is ui1, then the number of
subscribers to i is
ni1 =
1
2
+
ui1 ¡uj1
2t
:
Utility is made up in the following way:
ui1 = u(qi) + U(X i) ¡ piqi ¡ P i :
Here qi is the number of calls made to the …xed network, pi is the price per call to the …xed
network, Xi is the number of calls received by the subscriber from the …xed network, and P i
is the …xed charge for subscription. Therefore, U (¢) represents the bene…t that subscribers
obtain when they receive calls (i.e., it is the ‘call externality’).
It is useful to simplify this formula immediately. If c is the cost of making a call from
a mobile to the …xed network, then a mobile network will set pi = c in order to maximize
its pro…ts for a given level of surplus ui in the standard way. Therefore, pi is not really an
interesting choice variable in the problem, and so set pi = c and write v = maxq : u(q)¡ cq
2 0This comments applies equally to the advertising markets discussed in this paper. For instance, a TV
channel might charge more for a car advert if it promised not to show a rival’s advert in the same slot.
Gehrig (1998) analyzes this issue in a related model.
2 1 I assume that mobile subscribers make no calls to other mobile subscribers. If this feature were present
then we would enter the territory of network interconnection which is not the topic of this paper.
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for a subscriber’s resulting surplus from making calls to the …xed network at marginal cost.
Then the above expression for utility becomes:
ui = v +U (Xi) ¡ Pi :
Suppose that all mobile subscribers are roughly homogenous in terms of how many calls
they receive from the …xed network (for a given set of charges). Therefore, suppose that if
each mobile subscriber receives Xi calls from the …xed network, the mobile network obtains
revenue R(Xi) per subscriber. (In this context, this revenue comes in the form of ‘call
termination’ payments, but this makes no di¤erence to the analysis.) Suppose also that a
mobile network incurs the cost C(Xi) when it delivers these Xi calls to a subscriber.
Applying the previous analysis, we see from (17) that the equilibrium number of calls
delivered to mobile subscribers isX¤ per subscriber, where this maximizes U+R¡C . In other
words, this quantity is chosen to maximize the surplus available to mobile subscribers and
the mobile networks together, and the interests of callers on the …xed network are ignored.
From (19) we see that the equilibrium …xed charge for mobile subscription is
P = t+ f + C(X¤) ¡R(X¤) :
(Here f is the …xed cost of connecting an additional subscriber to a mobile network, such as
the cost of a mobile handset.) Thus, the charge for becoming a mobile subscriber, P , is equal
to the usual Hotelling formula, t+f+C(X¤), minus the revenue obtained from callers on the
…xed network, R(X¤). It is possible that, absent regulation of call termination, this revenue
could be large, and that P < f. In this case, access to the mobile network is subsidized below
the associated cost, and this could explain the prevalence of such institutions as ‘handset
subsidies’ in the industry.
As usual in this kind of ‘competitive bottleneck’ model, total welfare is not maximized
since the interest of …xed network callers are not taken into account when the quantity of
…xed-to-mobile calls X¤ is chosen. Welfare would be increased if X were increased, i.e., if the
implicit price for calling mobile subscribers from the …xed network were reduced to below
the unregulated equilibrium level.
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
A Generalized model with two-sided exclusive inter-
mediation
Here we generalize the simple model of section 4 to allow for (i) more than two groups of
participants and (ii) members of one group to care about the numbers of the same group
who have joined their intermediary.
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Suppose that each group has Hotelling-style preferences for the two intermediaries, and
if the two utilities o¤ered to group l are uAl and uBl , then …rm i will attract
nil =
1
2
+
uil ¡ ujl
2tl
customers from this group. Suppose that
uil =
MX
m=1
®lmnim¡ pil :
(Hence ®lm is the bene…t to a group l member of an additional member of group m. There
are M groups of participants in total.) Therefore
uil ¡ ujl =
MX
m=1
®lm(nim ¡njm) ¡ (pil ¡ pjl )
=
MX
m=1
®lm(2nim¡ 1) ¡ (pil ¡ pjl ) :
And so
nil =
1
2
+
1
2tl
(
MX
m=1
®lm(2nim¡ 1)¡ (pil ¡ pjl )
)
: (32)
We look for the symmetric equilibrium when intermediaries set prices. To obtain an explicit
formula for how market shares nil depend on the prices, as in (7) above, would entail a
signi…cant amount of linear algebra. However, we can side-step this problem using the
following approach. For a given set of prices fpjl g o¤ered by its rival, there is a one-to-one
relationship in (32) between i ’s prices fpilg and the number of customers it attracts fnilg. In
fact, if i sets the customer numbers fnilg, its prices must be given by
pil = p
j
l + 2tl(
1
2
¡ nil) +
MX
m=1
®lm(2nim¡ 1) : (33)
Therefore, for given rival prices fpjlg, i’s pro…t with fnilg is
¼i =
MX
l=1
nil
(
pjl +2tl(
1
2
¡ nil) +
MX
m=1
®lm(2nim¡ 1) ¡ fl
)
:
Maximizing this expression with respect to niz, and using the expression (33), yields
@¼i
@niz
= piz ¡ fz ¡ 2tzniz +
MX
l=1
2nil®lz = 0 :
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Since nil ´ 12 at the symmetric equilibrium, we see that the equilibrium prices are
pz = fz + tz ¡
MX
l=1
®lz :
This expression generalizes (8) above.
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